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Food sovereignty and Agricultural Trade policy commitments: what are the 
margins of manoeuvre for West African states? 
Introduction 
The  2008  food  crisis  has  challenged  the  political  legitimacy  and  economic  efficiency  of  the  deregulation  and 
liberalization of international agricultural trade. World agricultural price surge in 2007-2008 seems to confirm that 
developing countries, and particularly Africa, are threatened by imminent and chronic food crisis. While food riots, 
price surge and anxiety relative to climate change’s future effects reactivate for some, the distinction of the idea that 
food security is improved by agricultural trade liberalisation, because only trade can compensate for local markets 
insufficiencies  and  provide  to  consumers  commodities  at  low  prices.  An  alternative  vision  defended  within  Food 
Sovereignty discourse is to consider that long term food security cannot rest on dependence on food imports but must be 
built  on  the  development  of  domestic  production,  sheltered  from  world  price  fluctuations  and  unfair  competition, 
through sufficient barrier protection. Domestic West Africa production should also be more supported than it used to 
because climate change observed since the 20th  century could jeopardize agricultural production capacities in the near 
future if nothing is made to adapt African agriculture to this new context. This alternative approach to the World Trade 
system goes along with more or less violent accusations against the developed countries or international organizations 
to be the cause of accelerated liberalization which destabilizes West African markets. 
The purpose of this paper is to question the possibility for West African states to reach Food sovereignty given their 
various  trade  commitments  and  other  external  constraints.  Our  starting  hypothesis  is  that  the  concept  of  food 
sovereignty could be a political tool and could provide economic instruments to boost the protection of agriculture in 
developing  countries.  The  particularity  of  our  approach  is  to  combine  historical  economic  analysis  with  political 
approach (in term of strategy, confrontation and objectives of public policy actors) to Food sovereignty and trade 
commitments. 
Firstly, we ascertain that there is a huge gap between Food sovereignty discourse and instrumentation and reality of 
agrarian protection and support in developing countries in general and more specifically in Western Africa. The second 
part of this paper focus on the international binding commitments to test the reality of an antagonism between a neo-
liberal view of globalisation, carried out by the GATT/WTO system, and an alternative in favour of food sovereignty, 
by analysing recent negotiations, at WTO and with EPA, as well as to IMF structural adjustments conditions. The last 
part of our paper studies the internal constraints and dynamics related to the developpement of Food sovereignty Policy 
in West Africa.  
1. Food sovereignty movement reaction to the weakness of West African agricultural support 
and protection 
During the last 30 years, we note the weakness of support of agriculture in West africa and a continuous drop in the 
borders protection  which get sharper the last decade under the effect of regional integration process. Opposition to this 
trend grows under the standard of Food sovereignty.  
1.1. Low levels of agricultural domestic support and protection in West African countries 
A.O. Krueger et al. [1988] estimate the impact on agriculture of the general and sector policies put in place by 
18 developing countries in different  geographic regions over the 1975-1984. The direct effect is  measured by the 
difference  between  the  producer  price  and  the  border  price  adjusted  for  transport,  storage,  distribution  and  other 
marketing costs. The indirect effect comprises the impact of fiscal policies and industrial protection policies on the 
exchange rate and hence on the price of agricultural products relative to the price of other products. The authors find 
that, in almost all cases, the direct effects together are equivalent to a tax on exportable products (approximately 11% on 
average)  and  a  subsidy  for  imports  (approximately  20%  on  average).  The  indirect  effects  also  tax  agriculture 
(approximately 27%) and dominate the direct effects, even when these direct effects are directed towards helping the 
domestic agricultural sector.  
In the Berg report [World Bank, 1981], the nominal protection coefficients (NPC) calculated for most of the 
agricultural products exported from Sub-Saharan Africa (cocoa, coffee, groundnuts, cotton, sesame, tea, tobacco, maize 
and wheat) from 1971 to 1980 are found to be less than 1, revealing that these export crops were also taxed over the 
period studied. Araujo Bonjean & Chambas [1999] confirm that significant tax pressure continued to weigh on African 
agriculture, particularly export crops, in the 1990s, mainly for fiscal reasons. The agricultural sector in the developing 
countries has reportedly been taxed more on the whole than it has been subsidised since the 1970s. This situation has 
fostered imports from third countries and restricted investment in the sector.   2 
The Economic community of West African States (ECOWAS)1 had been founded in 1975 in order to develop 
economic integration of the 15 West African States: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo, 
Guinea Bissau, Cap Vert, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone. ECOWAS is endowed with a 
commission, a parliament, a court of justice and a Bank of investment and development. Revised ECOWAS Treaty of 
1993  makes  provision  for  building  an  agricultural  policy  in  order  to  provide  “agricultural  development  and  food 
security” [CEDEAO, 1993, art. 25] and for implementing a free trade area and then an economic and monetary union in 
the 15 years following 1990 [CEDEAO, 1993, art. 54]. Note that only Cap Vert, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria 
aren’t classified as Less Developing Countries. 
In  1994,  seven  ECOWAS  French  speaking  members  (Benin,  Burkina  Faso,  Côte  d’Ivoire,  Mali,  Niger, 
Senegal, Togo) and next Guinea Bissau in 1997, which already use the same currency (the CFA Franc) decide to found 
the West African economic and monetary union (WAEMU).  Following this decision, a custom union with a common 
external tariff (CET) is decided in 1998 that the 8 countries implemented in 2000. Four categories of products are 
distinguished.  Categories  “0”,  “1”,  “2”,  “3”  respectively  concern  essentials,  equipment,  intermediary  and  final 
consumption goods. Their respective tariff duties are 0, 5, 10 and 20%. Agricultural products essentially are in the 
classified category “3”. Non tariffs barriers have also to be eliminated soon.  
WTO tariff profiles give recent bound and applied tariffs for each member state. But there is a lack of available 
precise data about developing countries applied agricultural tariffs before 2000. In order to compare West African 
applied agricultural tariff before and after implementation of WAEMU CET, table 2 put together partial data coming 
from different WTO reports.  
WAEMU CET implementation raised to a significant reduction of average applied agricultural tariff of Burkina Faso, 
Côte d’Ivoire and Mali. There is no precise data available about previous average agricultural tariff for other WAEMU 
member states (Guinea Bissau, Niger, Senegal, and Togo). IMF annual reports (1997, 1998, 1999) indicate that all 
WEAMU countries had to face significant custom duty loss after the implementation of CET and custom union ; even 
agricultural products essentially have been placed in the forth band at 20% level tariff, average applied agricultural 
tariffs probably have sensibly decreased after 2000 and participated to the global external tariff erosion. The case of 
chicken in Senegal is particularly relayed by NGOs2. Senegal applied tariffs on chicken imports have progressively 
been reduced from 55 % in 1998 to 20 % in 2002, in accordance with WEAMU CET adoption and IFIs commitments, 
even if WTO chicken tariff is still bound at 150 %. This reduction of import applied tariff coincides with the rapid 
development of chicken fried cuts imports in Senegal, at very low prices, competing with local chicken production. 
Producers’ organisations assess 70% poultry farms have disappeared since the beginning of chicken fried cuts imports.  
In  2001  also,  all  ECOWAS  member  states  agree  that  WAEMU  common  external  tariff  (CET)  has  to  be 
enlarged to the entire West African Region. But the decision to implement the generalisation of CET is only taken in 
2006 for application in 2008. Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Mauritania and Nigeria don’t participate to WAEMU but 
are ECOWAS members. Table 2 shows that WAEMU CET generalisation to ECOWAS countries in 2008 raised also to 
significant erosion of previous agricultural average applied tariff clearly observed for Ghana, Mauritania and Nigeria. 
Note that Nigeria presented particularly high levels of agricultural applied tariffs at the beginning of the years 2000’. 
Nigeria is generally the most protectionist countries in West Africa. The Nigerian nationalism, based on pride to be a 
major African State and on belief that Nigeria must assure the protection of the black world, led his leaders to put it 
down in regional power, able of standing up to the biggest (Guy, 1990). Its economic nationalism declines notably by 
regular  protectionist  measurements  and  measurements  of  asperity  were  compared  to  the  interferences  of  the  IMF. 
Resistance  to  liberalization  of  agricultural  trade  is  yet  old  but  traditionally  originates  from  NGO’s  and  Peasants 
organisations. 
                                                 
1 CEDEAO in french 
2 See Oxfam France documents « Poulets : l’Europe plume l’Afrique »   3 
Table 1: Evolution of applied agricultural tariffs average between before and after West African Common external 
tariff implementation 
Countries  applied agricultural 
tariffs average post CET  
(year) 
Previous applied agricultural 
tariffs average (year) 
Evolution of agricultural tariffs 
 
WAEMU members (CET implemented in 2000) 
Benin  14.5 % (2008) (2)  na  na 
Burkina Faso  14.5 % (2008) (2) 
13.6 % (2004) (1) 
 
31.6 % (1998) (1) 
 
- 44 % (1) 
Côte d’Ivoire  14.5 % (2008) (2)  17.0 % agricultural,  
25.0 % transformed (1995) (1) 
“high reduction of agricultural 
tariffs” (1) 
Guinea  14.2 % (2008) (2) 
 
na  “no significant reduction” (1) 
Guinée Bissau  14.5 % (2008) (2)  na   
Mali  14.5 % (2008) (2) 
17.5 % (2004) (1) 
29.2 % (1998) (1)  - 40 % (1) 
Niger  14.5 % (2008) (2) 
13.1 % (2009) (1) 
na  na 
Senegal  14.5 % (2008) (2) 
13.1 % (2009) (1) 
na  na 
Togo  14.5 % (2008) (2)  na  na 
ECOWAS (non WAEMU) members (CET implemented in 2008) 
Cape Verde  12.1 % (2008) (2)  na  na 
Gambia  18.9 % (2008) (2) 
 
na  “high reduction of tariffs between 
1998 and 2000” (1) 
Ghana  17.4 % (2008) (2) 
15.7 % (2007) (1) 
20.0 % (2000) (4)  na 
Mauritania  10.1 % (2008) (2)  13.0 % (2001) (4)  na 
Nigeria  15.2 % (2008) (2) 
 
41.4 % (2005) (1) 
53.0 % (2002) (4) 
26.7 % (1998) (1) 
na 
Sources: authors using, (1) WTO Trade policy review WT/TPR/S/132, 46, 2, 127, 194, 153, 43, 133, 103, 223, 147, 
143, 166 ; (2) WTO, ITC, United Nations, Tariff Profiles 2009 ; na : not available because no WTO report before the 
date of CET implementation ; (3) authors calculations ; (4) USDA database. 
1.2 Food sovereignty claims 
In the 1990s, a certain number of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society representatives introduced 
the  concept  of  “food  sovereignty”  to  promote  the  idea  that  developing  countries  should  have  the  right  to  protect 
themselves from food imports from third countries when these imports compete with and risk destabilising the local 
production sectors. The concept was publically exposed for the first time by Via Campesina in 1996 in margin of the 
First  Food  World  Summit  organised  by  FAO  in  Roma.    It  has  since  been  taken  up  and  honed  by  global  justice 
campaigners in different  networks and international  Forums  which West  Africa organisations, like the network of 
Peasant organizations and Producers in West Africa (ROPPA) and the National Council for Dialogue and Cooperation 
of Rural people (Senegal), played a major role. 
In this context, food sovereignty refers to the global justice and affiliated movements that defend the right of 
people to feed themselves and consequently the right for nations to develop an agricultural policy in line with the 
interests of their own population without being a source of dumping for a third country. Some organisations, such as 
Via  Campesina,  accuse  the  current  WTO  rules  and  IMF  structural  adjustments  of  making  this  goal  unattainable. 
Stemmed from a collective mobilization, “food sovereignty” is purposed as a global alternative able to provide food 
security, and at odds with the liberalisation of agriculture as initiated at Uruguay Round. Food sovereignty implies the 
end of unfair competition on world markets and some kind of protection for developing countries domestic agricultural 
markets. The concept has induced incredible thought turmoil and contributed, when WTO trade negotiations reopened 
at the early 2000’s, to forward afresh the interest of State intervention in agricultural markets. But if the idea of food 
sovereignty is able to mobilize and federate citizens, it is delicate to express precisely into corresponding economic 
tools. 
In 2005, International NGO/CSO Planning Committee to the FAO drew up clear-cut market recommendations: 
“Market policies should be designed in order to: 
·  ensure adequate remunerative prices for all farmers and fishers;  
·  exercise the rights to protect domestic markets from imports at low prices;  
·  regulate production on the internal market in order to avoid the creation of surpluses;    4 
·  abolish all direct and indirect export supports; and  
·  phase  out  domestic  production  subsidies  that  promote  unsustainable  agriculture,  inequitable  land  tenure 
patterns  and  destructive  fishing  practices;  and  support  integrated  agrarian  reform  programmes,  including 
sustainable farming and fishing practices.” [NGO/FAO, 2005] 
The Nyeleni Forum for Food Sovereignty in 2007 designed the most explicit definition of food sovereignty to 
date as regards trade practices and policies: “Food sovereignty is the right of peoples to define their own food and 
agriculture policies, to protect and regulate domestic agricultural production and trade so as to attain their objectives of 
sustainable development, to determine in  what  measure they  want to be autonomous  and to limit the dumping of 
products on their markets“ [Nyeleni, 2007]. These definitions result from compromise and conglomeration work made 
within civil society international forums. Yet, they set clear guidelines for national trade policies: i) protect agricultural 
trade, and hence have the right to levy customs duties on imports of agricultural produce, ii) limit dumping, i.e. improve 
the competitiveness of exports and withdraw export subsidies. Food sovereignty is thus formulated by the peasant 
organisations and civil society organisations as a response to the dismantling of customs tariffs and domestic support 
policies initiated in the agricultural sector by the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, which were seen as a 
threat to the survival of agriculture in the Southern countries. 
Several cases of “unfair” trading were condemned by these same NGO/CSOs (Oxfam France campaigns – 
Agir Ici “PAC, FAO, OMC: la faim justifie les moyens!” [2001], “Chicken exports: Europe plucks Africa!” [2004] and 
“Pour un commerce plus juste: Faites du bruit jusqu'à Hong Kong !” [2005]. In their information and action campaigns 
against the ills of this type of competition, the CSOs unanimously condemned Northern countries’ agricultural export 
subsidies. They argued that they disrupt the Southern countries’ food crops, resulting in the food dependency of states, 
malnutrition and the vulnerability of peasant farmers to the volatility of world prices for the leading cereals. By the 
same token, the food sovereignty campaigners are in favour of the developing countries being able to protect their 
domestic markets from imports and limiting Northern country agricultural subsidies the time it takes to ensure their own 
agricultural development, including at the expense of bilateral and multilateral agreements. 
With the launch of the Doha Development Agenda, the NGOs managed to get in on the debate and make their 
demands known to the public. For example, Oxfam International took an international petition, the “Big Noise”, to 
Hong Kong with over 17 million signatures. It called for the WTO conference to lay down trade rules favourable to 
Southern countries, especially in the agricultural sector. Along with other organisations in its delegation, it worked hard 
on lobbying the different delegations attending the conference.  
Yet, these two preconisations (minimal protection of local markets and end of Northern agricultural dumping) 
reflect two currents of thought which, without being opposing, often led their advocacies separately to WTO. This is 
why, in 2005, cotton organizations, which preference was for the opening of the markets of the North (carried by 
Oxfam UK in WTO), went out of ROPPA, within which majority "mixed farming-animal husbandry " organizations 
centred their claims on the protection of the local markets. Some of most radical NGO/CSOs in those movements argue 
that there are two ostensibly antagonistic views of the development of the developing countries: theirs, which considers 
that the developing countries’ development calls for an exception to the trade liberalisation rules, and the WTO’s, which 
focuses in principle on the development of the developing countries via trade liberalisation.  
Two  years  after  the  food  crisis,  African  countries  seek  to  move  away  from  imports  which  become  more 
expensive. Several African states are beginning to turn to rely on the concept of food sovereignty to sit a goal of self-
sufficiency. Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade has launched the Great Offensive for Food and Abundance (Goana), 
a major public initiative aimed at ending the Senegal "food dependence" and ensure "food self-sufficiency" to achieve 
"food sovereignty”. It remains that food sovereignty is only one response element in the fight against under nutrition. 
Developing countries’agricultural sector historically benefits from neither significant domestic  support nor 
protection. The following section aims to test the reality of an antagonism between a neo-liberal view of globalisation, 
carried out by the WTO and IFI’s system, and an alternative in favour of food sovereignty. In the case of West Africa, 
what are the determinants of the choice of countries to neither support nor protect significantly agricultural sector? Has 
such a position been freely adopted or under international constraints? NGOs and more and more African states accuse 
Western countries of the North through international institutions, to force open their markets. What happens in reality? 
2. External forces in favour of agricultural trade openness in West Africa 
We randomly herethen look at the IMF structural adjustements conditions, the WTO recent negociations and bilateral 
negotiations of Economical Partnership Agreements with European Union. 
2.1. Role of International financial institutions (IFIs)  
The Berg report (World Bank, 1981) is quoted by a number of authors as being the catalyst for a political 
turning point that marked the end of the self-sufficiency policies in the developing countries since they were deemed 
scientifically baseless. This created a window for the developing countries to throw open their doors in a move to   5 
develop their export sectors (see, for example, Padilla, 1997). On reading this report again, the agricultural policy 
recommendations it implies for the Sub-Saharan African countries appear to be less radical. The report clearly criticises 
the inadequacy of African agricultural production given the region’s demographic growth. It points out the increase in 
the African countries’ dependence on food imports, observing the replacement of traditional food production (millet, 
sorghum, and root and tuber vegetables) with imported rice and wheat since 1981 in connection with urbanisation. The 
lack of investment in agriculture is explained by an inadequate border policy: overvalued local currencies penalise 
exports and foster imports, discouraging local production. 
Although the report effectively recommends developing export crops to cash in on Africa’s “obvious” comparative 
advantages in tea, coffee and cotton production, it considers that the investment needed to develop these crops should 
have positive repercussions on the simultaneous development of food crops by improving access to efficient techniques, 
inputs and equipment to improve farming yields. All the same, the World Bank points out that the development of 
export  crops  is  always  preferable  to  merely  maintaining  a  self-sufficiency  strategy.  Opening  the  food  marketing 
channels to the private sector is also one of the recommendations.  However, this same report clearly advocates that 
Sub-Saharan Africa should resume high enough import duties to prevent imported food from replacing local produce 
and should introduce a price policy in favour of producers, even if it is to the disadvantage of consumers [World Bank, 
(1981), p. 76]. 
Following  the  Berg  report  and  especially  the  financial  crisis  that  hit  many  developing  countries  in  the 
aftermath of the oil counter shock in the early 1980s, Matthews and Mahé [1995] mention that the IFIs (the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund) granted 36 loans to Sub-Saharan Africa and 46 loans to other world regions from 
1980  to  1987.  Of  these,  80%  and  33%  respectively  were  tied  to  structural  adjustment  conditions  connected  with 
agricultural  policies.  The  prescribed  measures  concerned,  on  the  whole,  reducing  visible  discrimination  against 
agriculture and improving economic incentive by restoring true prices. This basically meant reducing input subsidies, 
dismantling barriers to trade with third countries, and withdrawing the public sector from the production, service, and 
currency and trade control functions. The idea was for these countries to make the most of their comparative advantages 
in the food sector and the economy’s other sectors. Although the structural adjustment measures may well have helped 
develop export crops, they do not appear to have helped the traditional small subsistence farmer sector in the slightest 
[Matthew and Mahé, 1995]. At the same time, urbanisation was gathering pace in the developing countries in Asia, 
Latin America and Africa. 
At the end of the 1990s’, several West African countries have beneficiated from IMF loans with the same logic 
as described by Matthews and Mahé [1995]. Countries committed to reduce their external tariff protection for all 
products,  even  if  they  would  have  to  face  significant  custom  duty  losses.  IMF  clearly  encouraged  West  African 
countries to adopt the and generalize to the entire ECOWAS the  low harmonised tariff lines already introduced in 2000 
in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) members i.e., Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, 
Niger, Senegal, Togo. Dealing with agricultural sector, one can find recommendation of continuing structural reform 
(privatisation) and market liberalisation of few some particular or exported products (cotton, rice and sugar in Burkina 
Faso, coffee and cacao in Côte d’Ivoire), but  the priority for economical development seems to be given to other 
industries than agriculture. The necessity to develop agricultural or rural sector is marginally touched on for Mali and 
Niger (IMF, 1997, 1998, 1999 and “Letters of Intent” of governments, which describe the policies that the State intends 
to implement in the context of its request for financial support from the IMF, available at IMF website). 
Yet The 2008 World Bank Development Report  “Agriculture for Development” calls for greater investment in 
agriculture in developing countries, and  warns that the sector including household farming as long as it can sustain 
food security and rural employment, must be placed at the centre of the development agenda hereby marking a turning 
point in the Institution approach to Agriculture.  
2.2. The Doha Development Agenda round of agricultural negotiations 
As its name suggests, the Doha Development Agenda launched in 2001 was presented as the round of trade 
talks focusing on the development of the Southern countries, and this is regularly restated.3 Although the scope of the 
talks covers a number of sectors, agriculture is a core focus of the negotiations in that this sector holds an important 
place in the economies of the developing countries. Agricultural talks were launched on the three tracks of the 1994 
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture: market access, export competition and domestic support to agriculture.4 An 
analysis  of  the  negotiations  on  the  first  two  points  –  market  access  and  export  competition  –  sheds  light  on  the 
compatibility of the demands made with regard to food sovereignty and the international trade legislation liable to 
emerge from the agricultural talks at the WTO. 
                                                 
3 “The General  Council rededicates and recommits Members to fulfilling the development dimension of the Doha 
Development Agenda, which places the needs and interests of developing and least-developed countries at the heart of 
the Doha Work Programme.” Decision adopted by the WTO General Council on 1 August 2004. 
4 “(…) without prejudging the outcome of the negotiations we commit ourselves to comprehensive negotiations aimed 
at: substantial improvements in market access; reductions of, with a view to phasing out, all forms of export subsidies; 
and substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic support.” Doha Ministerial Declaration, 14 November 2001, 
Art. 13.   6 
The case of export competition is, in principle, the most straightforward. In 2005, the EU as the number one 
source of export subsidies undertook to phase out all use of these practices by 2013 provided that a comprehensive 
agreement on agriculture could be found and disciplines introduced on all other export-subsidising practices (export 
credits and state trading enterprises). The revised draft modalities dated July 20085 provide for the elimination of export 
subsidies by the end of 2013.  
Cotton is not a foodstuff. Nevertheless, the example of its treatment at the WTO demonstrates the convergence between 
the aims of the WTO processes and the food sovereignty campaigners’ demands concerning export competition. In 
2004, four African countries – Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali and Chad – stated a case that the high level of domestic 
support to the cotton sector in the developed countries, especially in the United States, constituted unfair trading on an 
international scale, much like export subsidies. The WTO responded to this petition by setting up a Sub-Committee on 
Cotton  tasked  with  addressing  the  particular  case  of  cotton  within  the  negotiations.  The  July  2008  revised  draft 
modalities consequently proposed special arrangements to improve competition on the cotton market while reducing the 
possibilities of domestic support in this sector for the developed countries6. In parallel to the negotiations, and without 
awaiting their completion, the United States were taken to task under the dispute settlement mechanism by a panel set 
up following a complaint filed by Brazil in September 2002. One of the panel’s conclusions [WT0, 2004], confirmed by 
the appellate body ([WTO, 2005], is that, in addition to the export credit guarantees, certain forms of domestic support 
granted to cotton producers in the United States constituted real export subsidies and effectively distorted trade on the 
international cotton market. Following these rulings, the United States is bound to bring its legislation into line with the 
panel’s conclusions. The case of cotton is a good illustration of the fact that, far from putting a brake on the cause of the 
developing countries, the WTO negotiations and dispute settlement procedures are in tune with the export competition 
claims filed with regard to the food sovereignty concept. So it is paradoxical to find that the NGOs welcome the stalling 
of the agricultural talks, as a failure could reduce the developed countries’ export subsidy withdrawal commitments to 
nothing. 
The “market access” component of the July 2008 revised draft modalities provides for a tiered formula for the 
reduction of bound tariffs. Bound tariff is, for each commodity, the maximum applicable rate of duty authorised, as 
informed to the WTO: the duty actually applied to each product must be lower than or equal to the bound tariff. Taking 
up the practice initiated by the Uruguay Round, the agricultural negotiations provide for the developing countries to 
benefit  from  special  and  differential  treatment  (S&D).  This  consists  of  applying  lower  levels  of  tariff  reduction 
commitments to the developing countries than to the developed countries, with longer time periods to implement them. 
Table 2 gives the formula or reduction commitments for the general case and the S&D treatment reserved to developing 
countries.  
Table 2 Formula for reduction of bound tariffs 
General   S&D  
Initial ad valorem tariff 
(AVT) tiers (%) 
tariff reduction 
commitment 
Initial ad valorem tariff 
(AVT) tiers (%) 
tariff reduction  
commitment 
AVT > 75  [66-73]%  AVT > 130  2/3 of [66-73]% 
50 < AVT < 75  64%  80 < AVT < 130  2/3 of 64% 
20 < AVT < 50  57%  30 < AVT < 80  2/3 of 57% 
AVT < 20  50%  AVT < 30  2/3 of 50% 
Average minimum 
reduction rate 
54% on average    36% on average 
Implementation period  5 years    8 years 
    Softer formula for LDCs and SVEs. 
 Source: WTO (2008) . The figures in square brackets mean that the talks have agreed on a bracket, but have not yet 
agreed on an actual final figure. 
Developed countries may define a small number of “sensitive” products to which they apply lower cuts offset by an 
increase in the minimum volume of imports allowed in at a lower quota.  S&D also entitles the developing countries to 
exclude  “special”  products  from  their  reduction  commitments  when  these  products  play  a  particular  role  in  the 
country’s national economy. Note that a product’s importance to “food security” is given as a valid reason to class a 
product in the “special” category. Similarly, under S&D, the developing countries, unlike the developed countries, 
continue to be covered by the special safeguard measure whereby they are entitled to raise their duties in the event of a 
sharp drop in prices or a significant increase in quantities imported.  
                                                 
5 The most recent at the time of writing this paper. 
6 Specific commitment to reduce the base OTDS (Overall Trade-Distorting Domestic Support) for cotton by more than 
the base OTDS reduction commitments for the other products; limitation of the use of the blue box (permitted supports 
linked to production) for cotton; and reduction of the timeframe for the implementation of the commitments to reduce 
support in this sector (WTO, 2008; TN/AG/W/4/Rev.3)   7 
The application of S&D reveals the importance of the developing country classification at the WTO, which grants 
separate  rights  to  each  category.  In  general,  there  is  no  specific  list  drawn  up  of  “developing  countries”.  This 
classification is based on the countries’ own declarations of their “developing” status. The United Nations draws up an 
annual list of “least developed countries” (LDCs), defined as the world’s poorest countries on the basis of a range of 
criteria. “Small vulnerable economies” (SVEs) are a new category of countries introduced by the Doha Round. SVEs 
are defined as countries with very little share of word agricultural and non-agricultural trade ;  criteria and the list of 
eligible countries are still on the negotiating table. 
At first glance, even though there is no actual mention of the term “food sovereignty” in the draft modalities, some of 
the S&D technical provisions entitle the developing countries to keep their bound tariffs at levels subject to lower or 
zero reduction commitments and give them the right to temporarily apply special safeguard measures in the event of 
market  disruption  to  prevent  abnormal  increases  in  imported  quantities.  Yet  does  this  mean  that  the  developing 
countries can, under the international trade regulations, sustainably raise their tariffs on agricultural products in order to 
develop a protectionist import policy? 
Table 3: Agricultural bound and applied tariffs in developing countries, 2007 






Mean bound tariff after 
implementation of July 
2008 draft 
Number of countries 
with bound > applied 
tariffs 
115 WTO developing countries  60%  15%  37%  106 / 115 
- Animal products  63%  18%    107 
- Dairy products  58%  18%    106 
- Cereals and preparations  60%  15%    108 
ECOWAS West African countries   64%  15%  40%  15 / 15 
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on data collected for 115 WTO member developing and transition countries, using 
the United Nations definition.7 Bound tariffs: taken from WTO data published in the 2008 and 2009 tariff profiles8; 
applied rates taken from the WTO Integrated Data Base.9,  
Actually,  the  developing  countries  already  have  a  great  deal  of  room  for  manoeuvre  under  the  WTO 
regulations, to step up their protection from imports from third countries without exceeding the ceiling defined by the 
bound tariff10. This is also the case for the 15 ECOWAS West African countries, which present a real homogeneity of 
agricultural applied tariff levels, even if their bound tariffs are very different from one country to another. Developing 
countries’ bound agricultural tariffs stand at 60% on average. Application of the S&D rate of reduction would therefore 
give rise to an average bound tariff of around 37% (40% for West African countries), which is still more than twice as 
high as the average applied rates in 2007 (15%). In other words, West African developing countries don’t use effective 
room of manoeuvre: they don’t implement protection of their agricultural markets from imports at levels authorised by 
WTO,  and  their  applied  agricultural  rates  are  generally  lower  on  average  than  those  practised  by  the  developed 
countries. 
2.3. Economical Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with European Union (EU) 
  Economical Partnership Agreements (EPAs) were intended to create a WTO-compatible system between the 
European  Union  (EU)  and  African  Caribbean  and  Pacific  (ACP)  States,  based  on  reciprocal  trade  commitments, 
contrary to previous EU-ACP Lomé-Cotonou Agreements which were built on EU market access concessions to ACP 
exports without counterparties.  
Several groups of ACP countries have separately negotiated with the EU since early 2000s’ in order to conclude EPAs; 
West African region was one of those blocs. Note that in 2008, most West African countries have refused to sign the 
negotiated EPA except Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana. Pannhausen (2006) estimates the effects of reducing to zero West 
African tariffs on some agricultural commodities imported from UE (milk, poultry, wheat, wheat flour and processed 
tomatoes). Basically such a reduction would basically lead to significant producers and government custom duties 
losses, balanced by benefits to consumers because of the lower prices, the overall welfare effect being indeterminate.  
In  order  to  be  WTO  compatible,  EPA  mustn’t  exclude  wholly  a  major  sector  from  liberalisation.  Hence 
agricultural  and  processing  food  products  have  not  been  excluded  as  a  whole,  but  negotiations  have  lead  to  the 
                                                 
7 “Classification of Economies”, UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2008, pp 26-28. 
8 http://www.wto.org/french/res_f/booksp_f/tariff_profiles09_f.pdf ; 
9 iaf.wto.org (authorised users only). 
10 Obviously, this average finding does not take into account the case of certain products in some countries that may be 
more specifically targeted by a level of applied protection close to the bound level, and may therefore lose this leeway 
following the application of the rates of reduction. Nevertheless, a study of recent tariff data at a more detailed level of 
agricultural products suggests that these cases remain few and far between.   8 
designation of “sensible products” at a more disaggregated level, which are excluded from tariff reduction schedules 
because of food security or tariff revenues concerns. Some agricultural products have been classified “sensible” to that 
sense (like “special products” in the frame of WTO multilateral negotiations). Some other agricultural commodities 
have not been excluded from liberalisation but the tariff reduction commitments will be implemented after a very long 
period (25 years). ACP countries have used those flexibility facilities. As a result, almost agricultural commodities 
aren’t directly concerned by a significant fall of import tariffs applied to EU products (Matthews, 2010). Note that for 
the two only West African Region EPA signatories in 2008, Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, wheat and milk powder tariffs are 
scheduled to go to zero soon (in 2011 for Côte d’Ivoire, 2013 for Ghana), but those commodities are already submitted 
to the lowest import tariff rate (5 %).  
ECOWAS CET constitutes one of the determinants of the preferential negotiation to lead with the EU: the higher the 
CET, the more ECOWAS have margins of negotiations with EU in terms of limitation of import tariff reduction on 
sensible products. The perspective of a generalisation in 2008 of a Common external tariff (CET) at low level for all 
ECOWAS countries leads to a situation where agricultural tariffs are maximum 20%. At this level, EU does not need to 
negotiate more because this tariff is already lower than its own11. As a result, EPA negotiations have not lead to 
significant reduction of ACP agricultural tariff barriers. The main remaining disagreement between the European Union 
and the countries of Western Africa within the EPA negotiations concerns the list of the industrial products to be 
liberalized and their rate of liberalization, the president Wade still refusing (in December, 2010) any idea of financial 
compensation in the name of the principle of protection of rising industries (ICTSD, 2010) 
 
3. Internal constraints and prospects for agricultural domestic policy in West Africa?  
 
We first highlight the traditional internal brakes in protection of West - African agriculture; we then disclose the signs 
of a change of these policies through regional integration and agrarian policies.Bas du formulaire 
3.1. “Urban bias” persistence 
 
Food security and political stability are often mutually dependent and reinforcing. Food security can influence 
the  political  stability  of  countries  like  in  the  case  of  Niger  where  chronic  food  crisis  causes  permanent  political 
instability since independence. Greatest risks though for regime stability are urban riots that are sometimes sparked by 
food shortages or sudden price increases among food products. Generally, starvation in the countryside does not result 
in political instability because those who experience the brunt of food shortages tend to be rural and have little political 
voice. Clearly, this favours an approach in favour of urban consumers versus small farmers. 
The bet into the political agenda of food security systematically followed major food crisis. Padilla [1997] 
looks at the history of food in African towns and cities. Following the severe food crisis in 1973-1974, most of the 
African  nations  resolved  to  introduce  multi-sector  “food  planning”  to  guarantee  national  food  security  via  the 
development of self-sufficiency. In practice, agricultural production planning ultimately concerned cash crops only. 
Food planning did not happen and urban supplies relied mainly on imports and food aid. Consequently, specific food 
policies developed. Governments often introduced subsidies for food purchases so that urban consumers could eat for a 
reasonable price. Those food policies fostered consumption irrespective of the origin of the production with the result 
that they did not necessary benefit domestic farmers, since they also helped to develop food imports. 
Paradoxally, with world agricultural prices depressed from 1960 to 2000, import protection appeared as a way 
for developing countries to expand their domestic production sheltered from too large a drop in prices. In this light, it 
could be posited that the emergence of the food sovereignty concept in the late 1990s has helped to clarify certain 
developing countries’ petitions to the WTO for the right to better import protection and a ban on rich countries’ export 
subsidies. In 2000, the trend started to shift on the world markets. World demand rose more sharply than supply and the 
downward trend in agricultural prices slowed from 2000 to 2007. Nevertheless, world agricultural prices continue to be 
seen as paying too little to agricultural producers in the developing countries (see the position of the associations in 
2003 expressed in Cancun). 
But in 2007-2008, agricultural prices suddenly spiralled, triggering hunger riots in a number of developing 
countries in 2008. The developing countries responded in different ways to this situation, but many chose, at least as a 
short-term emergency measure, to develop imports, reduce exports to ensure supplies to the cities [FAO, 2009], and 
even apply an export tax. Yet, unlike customs duties, this trade regulating instrument benefits domestic consumers and 
not producers.  
  Beyond strict “urban bias”, there are other internal brakes to agricultural domestic support and protection. One 
reason lays in the long lasting- belief of urban African political elites that trade liberalization and not agriculture, 
                                                 
11 However EPAs’ negotiations lead to other commitments that are susceptible to have consequences in terms of food 
security: ban of export restriction and taxes, limits of using the bilateral safeguard clause… that go beyond WTO 
discipline (Matthews, 2010).   9 
particularly  family  and  food-producing  agriculture,  is  the  key  to  development.  One  main  reason  for  World  Bank 
supporting so few Agricultural projects is the lack of Projects related to agriculture itself.  
Another reason is more technical : the technical preparation of applications to exceptions to WTO rules recovering from 
S&D or the discussion to define what are “sensitive” (APE) or “Special”(WTO) products is complex, few countries 
have this skill.  
Furthermore, in a certain number of countries, agro-importers and agro-exporters are very few as in the case of rice; 
there are eight main importers for the whole African continent and economically overwhelming. Showing, that customs 
and harbour zones are the main places of corruption and fraud’ institutionalization in Benin, Nassirou Bako-Arifari 
shows that frauds and dissimulation are practices considered as positive in the popular ethics of the storekeepers and the 
other importers. On the other hand, requests of deal can go back up all the levels to touch directly Minister of Finance 
so  reporting  a  direct  collusion  between  international  traders  and  politicians.  They  are  also  (over)  represented  in 
restricted circles of power, sometimes through family networks, and their economic interests go to the sense of the 
pursuit of the opening to the exchanges. 
However one can observe a recent sensible evolution. A vast investigation realizes in 2009 for the World Bank 
coordinated by K. Anderson assess the trend of nominal rate of assistance on several periods from 1955 to 2006-2007 in 
75 developing countries. Authors conclude that, even if agriculture stay a sector more taxed than subsidized, there is a 
sensible decrease (from an average about 20% in 1980s’ to 7-8% in the 2000s’) of agricultural taxation, links with 
structural reforms. But direct support to agricultural sector has not increased, but regressed during the same period. In 
other words, handicaps for agriculture have been progressively reduced but domestic support is still insignificant. 
3.2 A turn of West African countries integration trends 
During the months before the 2008 deadline, there has been a large debate about the opportunity to revise the 
categorisation of WAEMU tariffs. Nigeria which presents the highest bound levels of tariffs at WTO, claimed in 2004 
for a fifth category at 50 % tariff to be applied to industrialised products, in order not to brake domestic growth. This 
argument has been taken also by agricultural producers’ organisations (ROPPA, 2006) to argue that agricultural goods 
have to benefit from a higher level of protection. In its argumentation ROPPA established a direct link between the 
growing West Africa food trade deficit between 1995 and 2003 and the reduction of import applied tariff resulting from 
regional integration within of WAEMU.  
In 2008, two events happen. First, APE trade negotiations have heightened civil society awareness of danger to 
liberalise agricultural trade with EU because EU agricultural goods may compete with domestic products and disturb 
domestic production industry. This experience reinforced the control of West African States, which have regularly 
appealed to experts12. Second, 2008 was the year of generalisation of WAEMU CET to the whole ECOWAS, which 
was problematic especially for Nigeria which was previously applying higher tariffs on agricultural goods. As a result, 
the  ECOWAS-WAEMU  Ministerial  Committee  of  following  EPA  negotiations  decided  to  examine  the  effects  of 
introducing a fifth category of CET at an higher level than 20 %, for a group of products to be listed [ECOWAS, 
WAEMU, 2008a]. At the end of 2008, the principle of a fifth category at 35 % has been introduced for a higher level of 
protection of sensible products that need to be protected to boost the domestic production. The definition of the list of 
goods is not yet established in 2010, because there are divergences among countries about criteria of sensibility and 
sensible products. But it seems that this new fifth category certainly would concern transformed food like poultry, 
cheese and yogurts, but also potatoes, flour, refined vegetal oils, pasta, biscuits and drinks. WAEMU purposed rice to 
be eligible to this fifth category but some States, like Senegal, fear that a higher protection of rice would increase food 
price for urban areas consumers. 
From West African Civil Society Forum (WACSOF) point of view, chosen methodology to target the fifth 
CET band at 35 % on appropriate commodities has to be built in accordance with the identification of sensible products 
in the frame of APE negotiations, by analysing needs in terms of protection against imports from EU. Hence EPA 
negotiations  have  actually  contributed  to  develop  West  African  Countries  expertise  about  their  protection  needs 
(PASCOA, 2010). 
Apparently, this fifth level of protection could be the core of the emergence a first pillar of building a real 
common agricultural policy for ECOWAS based on targeted protection. But agriculture suffers from so many direct and 
indirect taxations that a second pillar relative to domestic support has to be completely defined.  
3.3. Emergence of agricultural policy in West African countries  
In 2001, WAEMU adopted the principles of building a common agricultural policy [UEMOA, 2001]. But 
nothing matters between 2001 and 2008. However Mali and Senegal have wrote the objective of food sovereignty in 
their last agricultural laws. 
Since independence, agrarian policies in both countries have always been governed by development plans. In December 
2005 in Mali, further to an important consultation, the president Toure adopted the Law of agrarian orientation (LOA). 
                                                 
12 Gallezot, Laborde   10 
This policy aims at accompanying modernization and diversification of agriculture and to create an agrarian status. In 
the case of the Senegal, the "Strategy of speeded up growth " adopted in 2008 envisages group of measurements of 
support for areas with great potential of growth among which appear agrarian chains. The objective of modernization of 
agriculture is then finally set apparently. Both acts have a declared objective to reduce poverty and attain food security 
via food sovereignty.  
May  2008  Food  crisis  pushed  governments  to  intensify  support  policy  to  agricultural  sector  while  announcing 
resumption in hand of agriculture regulation by political power. Mali 2008 "Rice Inititiave" gave ciphered objectives of 
production for ongoing season. Senegalese 2008 "Great offensive for food and abundance" (GOANA) is a vast public 
initiative which aims at ending « food dependency » of the Senegal and at assuring " food self-sufficiency " to achieve « 
food sovereignty ». It aims in most cases at an important increase of production of grain and subsistence crops. The 
most important growth concerns cultures intended for home consumption, notably fonio, niébé and thousand. In spite of 
its ambitious objectives and means and its real geopolitical range (" the Africain revival "), this initiative remains very 
questioned by the National Council of country cooperation and collaboration which regret the peasants responsibility 
eroding effect, via numerous subventions, and the slightest participation of the professionals in the catch of political 
decision.  
Maybe  national  experience  of  Mali  or  Senegal  in  that  concern  could  put  light  on  possible  mechanism  to 
develop agricultural industry in West African Countries, before adopting adapted mechanism for the whole region. With 
ECOWAS single market, separate national approaches have no real perspective because they would raise problems of 
competition  distortions.  But,  and  that  is  relatively  new,  even  such  initiatives  have  been  influenced  by  ONG-OSC 
lobbying, they are officially supported by Governments, and presented as national projects to international organisations 
(WTO,  FMI):  the  last  WTO  Trade  Policy  Review  of  Niger  and  Senegal  (WT/TPR/S/223,  2009-2010)  mentions 
ECOWAS countries plan to implement a common agricultural policy (ECOWAP) targeting to take into account food 
sovereignty of the Region, that justify the reflexion about increasing the highest level of ECOWAS CET to be applied 
to some agricultural commodities. But ECOWAP implementation raises also the problem of how to finance the project. 
Should  it  be  supported  by  international  funds,  as  would  seem  to  suggest  recent  communications  from  certain 
organisations (World Bank, 2007; Diouf, 2009)? Or should it be advocated that the public budgets (national or regional) 
and/or the consumers in these nations pick up the tab? 
The NGO/CSOs argue that the analysis of the environment surrounding the 2007-2008 food crisis proves the risk for 
the developing country populations of depending on the world markets for their food supplies from the point of view of 
product price and availability. In this respect climate change could contribute to reinforce the dependency of Western 
Africa with world markets. However NGO/CSO’s approach quietly differs from food planning attempts of the 1970s’: 
the political project surrounding food sovereignty is merely a question of establishing a regional common agricultural 
policy without dumping on the international markets.. in 2005, the peasant farmer organisations successfully lobbied for 
the ECOWAS agricultural policy, ECOWAP, to be based on the principle of the region’s food sovereignty (Gallezot, 
2006). These organisations continue to advocate the regulation of local agricultural markets via both import protection 
and the ramping up of domestic support to promote the development of domestic production (Flament, J, Parmentier, S 
and Van Der Steen D. [2009]). 
Conclusion 
The concept of food sovereignty emerged in the 1990s, promoted by civil society representatives campaigning 
for  new  rights  for  the  developing  countries  to  implement  their  own  food  policy.  It  is  expressed,  with  regard  to 
international agricultural trade, notably through the right for developing countries to protect themselves more from 
imports from third countries even if it implies not to respect certain international commitments. This position, skilfully 
instrumented by certain African States, suggests that the food sovereignty of the Western Africa countries, that we 
considered  here,  would  be  threatened  by  the  pressure  of  the  liberal  international  organizations,  livened  up  by  the 
defence of the States which would have most interest in the development of their international commercial outlets.  
We do ascertain in this paper that the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund tie, since the 80s, loans 
to structural adjustment conditions connected with agricultural policies. Yet the analysis of the content of the WTO 
Doha  Development  Agenda  round  of  agricultural  negotiations  shows  that  they  are  directed  at  improving  export 
competition and that the proposed compromises are not a significant constraint on the development By the same token, 
EPA  negotiations  with  EU  have  not  lead  to  significant  reduction  of  ACP  agricultural  tariff  barriers  of  an  import 
protection policy for most of the developing countries.  
After all, it seems that the essential determiners to the West-African Statex withdrawal from agriculture are to 
be looked, not in the international community pressure, but in the internal set of actors and the national political and 
economic balance of power. The urban bias seems a key element in this opening. We develop however the hypothesis 
of a certain erosion of this obvious principle in the last developments around the ECOWAP and the revision of the 
WAEMU CET. 
On the one side, in 2005, the peasant farmer organisations successfully lobbied for the ECOWAS agricultural 
policy, ECOWAP, to be based on the principle of the region’s food sovereignty (Gallezot, 2006). This was paradoxical   11 
at a time when the EU’s CAP had been dismantled following the introduction of agriculture into the WTO/GATT trade 
talks. It brings the problem of how to finance the project. Should it be supported by international funds, as would seem 
to  suggest  recent  communications  from  certain  organisations  (World  Bank,  2007;  Diouf,  2009)?  Or  should  it  be 
advocated that the public budgets (national or regional) and/or the consumers in these nations pick up the tab?  
Further, at the end of 2008, the principle of a fifth category at 35 % has been introduced for a higher level of protection 
of sensible products that need to be protected to boost the ECOWAS agricultural production. It would be interesting to 
examine what the IFIs suggest after the food crisis of 2007-2008, because IFIs seems to be the most binding external 
force against an increased protection. What would be economic tools of ECOWAP? To analyse this, further researches 
will deal with measure of domestic support in West African developing countries and put the light on effective brains 
for agricultural development (input taxation, monetary effects etc.) and determine the most adapted support way for 
countries.  
We shall observe further whether Regionalism in West Africa, that seems so far to have accelerated trade liberalisation 
in the region could actually become a tool for a agricultural development policy at regional level, via building an 
ECOWAP.Would this evolution be revealing of a new principle of " of “rising agricultures protection” "? 
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